INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
I will argue that international organizations are caught in the middle of a paradox as they seek to implement international goals in local contexts. It is this: that events and phenomena like schools and educational ideas have what appear to be mutually exclusive properties -that they are both unique to context and comparable with other contexts; they have both a global and a local character. Schools, for example, are both compoarable across countries and cultures and unique to heir host communities. This is a paradox that afflicts UNICEF, as with other international agencies, as it struggles to resolve the tension between its global accountabilities and its roots in a local (in-country, often municipal) action-base with obligations to children, families and communities.
One of the implications of this paradox is that we have to think flexibly about what counts as a standard or as a goal, allowing them to be determined locally -to reflect the priorities and preferences of citizens and communities -and globally -to reflect international agreements and advances in internationally-recognised moralities. In respect of evaluation I will show how thinking simultaneously of democracy and rights in evaluation -in fact, as determinants of evaluation design -allows for the mediation of the global and the local, especially in respect of MDGs.
Though rights and democracy are frequently thought of by rights theorists as being in tension, program evaluation allows for their unification. I will talk briefly about a right-based approach to evaluation.
DEMOCRATIC EVALUATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
Evaluators have rehearsed proposals for democratic evaluation for many years. For some, the search for singular calculations of the productivity of a program was secondary to the need to ensure that programs were properly held to public account but also that judgements to be made about programs were not the sole prerogative of a social or political or administrative elite. Indeed, democratic evaluators have argued that measures of program productivity may well, in themselves, be insufficient to meet the democratic obligations of the evaluator -taking into account the diversity of values in a program, the instability of output measures, program politics and typical conflicts over program purposes.
What is argued for in Democratic Evaluation is such as: open exchange of information across stakeholder groups; evaluation as a space in which power inequalities can be (procedurally) neutralized -i.e. equal treatment for all (mother, manager, minister) ; the independence and impartiality of the evaluator whose obligation is to address everyone's dilemmas; free and open publication of evaluation reports; and a recognition of collective responsibility for enhancing public information (MacDonald, 1976 , Ryan & DeStefano, 2000 -but see below for a more detailed account). Clearly, key to any democratic evaluation process is participation as a form of direct representation (Ryan & Johnson, 2000) .
Notwithstanding the weight of issues considered by its theorists, Democratic Evaluation as a methodology has been more popular than practiced. This may be due to the demands it makes for sophistication in action, together with the fact that it is often unattractive to sponsors who are wary of the loss of contractual control over the evaluation and its publication and jealous of the resource they see themselves as having paid for. It may also be the case that where public evaluation is mostly practiced is in those advanced industrial countries where it is less compelling to make the link between democratic evaluation and good governance -a link that lies at the heart of the methodology.
Perhaps most significant of these factors has been the widespread failure of the link between Democratic Evaluation and governance. As originally conceived, the methodology both made up for a democratic deficit in social programs (e.g. enhancing the accountability of program managers and political sponsors to other program stakeholders) and offered to make the conditions of our democracies transparent by seeing a social program as a microcosm of society at large (i.e. each evaluation is a case study of political society). Democratic structures and assumptions are sufficiently strong in Europe and the US to dilute the political imperative behind Democratic Evaluation.
The imperative behind this link is stronger in international development settings where the absence of 'good (i.e. democratic) governance' and the frequent absence of program accountability to stakeholders and citizens is prevalent. Here, Democratic Evaluation would seem to hold promise for those who advocate more open, accountable and responsive forms of governance -at program, municipal and national levels. However, preoccupations over democracy and information rights have permeated only little into evaluation practices in international development (see, for example, Cameron & Ojha, 2007; Segone, 2006) . Program evaluation for development is mostly confined to impact assessment and, increasingly, audit and accountability. The search for the elusive unified calculation of quality or program productivity dominates international organizations who are under accountability pressures from their donors to see programs of intervention less as opportunities to engage citizens in deliberations over priorities and more as delivery systems for pre-specified results. The link between democratic evaluation and democratic governance has not been sufficiently well forged.
But democratic evaluation has always been promoted within the context of national political cultures and does not easily transfer to global contexts. It is probably fair to say that democratic evaluation was implicitly modeled on civic democracy in a liberal, Western state, with expectations of social exchange, deliberation and the building of social consensus. Indeed, Deliberative Democratic Evaluation (House & Howe, 1999 ) -its most recent expression -emphasizes the kind of social exchange that is almost inconceivable beyond levels of local intimacy in political cultures. Democratic Evaluation functions through social conversation -so it needs to talk in a national 'language'. The warrant of the democratic evaluator emanates from the democratic aspirations of the society which commissions it -it is an echo of political ambition.
At a level of global action we cannot assume or achieve political singularity -there is no such clear echo. There is no civic context to a global world. Here, we struggle to find the source for that same democratic warrant. The signatories to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), for example, are too diverse in their political hue, at too diverse stages on democratic journeys to provide a stable base for evaluation mandates placing these goals under critical scrutiny. I will take a detailed look at MDGs a little later, for they stand as a global program and are the test case for looking at the constraints and possibilities of democratic evaluation in global contexts. The challenge for the democratic evaluator is to find a way of grounding a constructive critique of MDGs in what are often referred to as 'beneficiary communities' -as a way of transferring ownership to them of the goals.
In this chapter I explore a rights-based approach to evaluation, one that draws for its warrant from international statements of authority -treaties and conventions. A rights-based approach to evaluation is not a substitute for democratic evaluation, it is merely an adaptation that may be appropriate to global programs and to international contexts -a means for bridging awesome distances between international elites and disadvantaged communities. It has the added advantage of a vocabulary that is familiar to development workers and organizations. All contemporary international development programs are required to be 'rights-based' (Jonsson, 2003 , Black, 2008 .
I start the chapter, however, with a paradox that always faces the educational evaluator, but which is heightened in the case of global action. This is the paradox of what we might think of as 'situated generalisation' -that any educational event has Heisenberg-like properties that make it simultaneously idiosyncratic and law-like. How we resolve the paradox in action -in, for example, designing an evaluationhas often grave implications for how we distribute rights.
A GLOBAL PARADOX
Wherever we travel in the world we find classrooms recognisableinstructional arrangements, many small people facing one large person, authority structures and power asymmetries, repressed desires, scrutiny, revelations, learning, judgement, confusions between play and work…we see and readily recognise them all. Under a Baobab tree in Central Africa, in an adobe shack in the Bolivian highlands, in the suburbs of an English city, in the shadow of a Buddhist temple in Thailand and in a tent in a Middle-Eastern desert -teachers teach and pupils learn in ways that make it easy for us to hold educational conversation across cultural boundaries.
Classrooms are familiar settings. Partly as a result, the language of pedagogy has become a global language. From all over the world educators come to Europe to reflect on their practice, and our cultural and political differences apparently present no barrier to conversation. I have visited Malaysia only fleetingly, and yet through a series of doctoral supervisions I seem to have come to know Malaysian schooling to the point where I am taken seriously in conversation by educators there. How can it be that we pretend to such cross-cultural knowledge while still cherishing the view that our cultural traditions confirm our uniqueness, make us exotic to each other? Look again at classrooms. We enter a primary school in our own 'back yard' as a parent or as a researcher, and we are acutely awareespecially as parents -that two classrooms next to each other on the same corridor are two different worlds. One, perhaps, has a middle-aged, energetic teacher with a progressive approach to open education and holding an overriding educational principle that you have to love the children -and from that, all else flows; in the other class, a young, inexperienced teacher made nervous by overwhelming complexity and a fear of children is conservative and disciplinarian, and focuses, not on the children, but on the formal curriculum. The two teachers can as easily talk to each other as walk together to the canteen -but they may well find the distance between their respective value positions too great to overcome.
Their classrooms are their invented countries, the gap between them is as wide and as deep as the gap between cultures, and it frustrates attempts at conversation. We know this well from the history of school-based innovation which too often fails through the difficulties innovative teachers have of negotiating their way with colleagues. On this side of the paradox classrooms are unique, far from readily familiar, and the unpredictability of their cultural formation denies the possibility of universal description.
Not only this, as pupil cohorts and teachers themselves change from year to year, so the cultural formation of each classroom shifts and changes.
The global classroom dissipates into unstable idiosyncrasy.
The same, of course, goes for schools -again, especially primary schools -where the head teacher, as head of a professional 'family' sets the cultural tone in ways that are as distinctive as his or her own personality and biography. Schools, too, are both recognisable and different one from another. The social order of schooling is, in one sense, enduring -'frozen'
as House (1974) 's values." (1967:75) As against this we cannot deny the value global measures of classrooms and schooling have created. Gage (1996) , for example, reviews the successes of meta-analysis in the behavioural sciences and the very concept of generalisation across educational contexts. Consistency rests upon the assumption of universal or global characteristics of classrooms and classroom interactions that allow for ecological, cross-context measurement. Gage points to a range of key educational generalisations which appear to be founded upon such consistency -they take the form of relationships: socio-economic status related to academic achievement; years of schooling to amount of knowledge gained; co-operative learning related to race relations; personalised instruction to achievement levels; behavioural instruction to learning gains. Indeed, so successful have some of these been that they form part of a widely accepted 'folklore' of education. Perhaps they do form a set of global (PISA-type) criteria against which we can successfully make measured comparisons of the performance of education systems globally? Perhaps there is hope for a global liberalism in education?
The implications of the paradox are far-reaching, and pose questions at the heart of contemporary 'school effectiveness' movements, the 'new public management' (NPM) and their global equivalents in education. This new context is based on low-trust accountability, performance management and results-based programming (Norris & Kushner, 2007) and it embraces the global liberalism of international agencies which are all committed to it. NPM is only possible where we are able to control for context since cross-site comparisons and bench-marking are key to its legitimacy and functioning. In this sense, inter-contextual comparison is designed, not for arriving at broad generalizations of the kind suggested above, but for ensuring compliance with policy -i.e. control-forconsistency. For NPM to operate effectively we have to assume the comparability of classrooms and schools -that the few can be measured against the many. Let us take a critical look at the global approach to NPM that is represented by Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and at their implication for global evaluation.
MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 4
An international agreement was adopted by 189 nations and signed by 147 heads of state and governments during the UN Millennium Summit in 
GLOBAL EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION
The accountability aspect of MDGs is supported by a sub-program within This is not to undermine the millennium aspiration, but to bring into question its articulation as a goal, its evaluation and how we account for context -the other side of the paradox. What I also want to highlight, for this is the theme of the later stages of this chapter, is the impact of universalist comparators on democracy and participation -in short, who owns these goals? It is often the case that an indicator may be written in ways that are more or less useful to mothers, families and communities, say, and more or less inviting of them to join the development push. For example, a community or municipality seeking to take control of its own educational development will find local comparisons (i.e. with proximal contexts and/or within the same culture and conditions) more meaningful than cross-country comparisons -whereas a national government setting broad policy parameters might find other country data more informative.
A community will find 'attendance' measures more useful in solving exclusion, just as national governments may find 'enrolment' more useful in resolving international accountability demands.
Let me take one other example from the area of early childhood development. How do we measure chronic malnutrition in pursuit of MDG4? In practice, this is measured either by 'wasting' (calculating weight for height) or 'stunting' (calculating height for age) and the decision which to opt for is made by an agency or a government or, indeed, an agency's regional office. It is then applied in a uniform way to communities and families and the measures used as a basis for policy advocacy and institutional development. For mothers on the ground, the choice of method is significant, since one (stunting) is more observable to her than the other and allows her to participate in the monitoring process, whereas the other (wasting) requires weighing technology and measurements over time. Choice of one indicator over the other may be consistent with methodological policy and useful in policy contexts, but less useful and less inclusive for a mother. All such indicators are unstable in one way or another. 
Strengths and weaknesses of the universalist project:

 They represent an international consensus on a moral framework:
The moral framework derives from the deliberations of international elites, not from those who are intended beneficiaries. In any event,
there is a logical and a rights-based inconsistency to the concept of 'international' morality -moral systems are always culturally, even locally, embedded. Concentrating the moral centre of gravity at global and international levels has a tendency to leave national and local levels to concentrate on its applications -i.e. on technical aspects of development. Above all, with the dominance of universalism, too little work has been done to ensure ownership of the MDG effort in local, civil society (it is too late to ensure socially embedded democratic ownership of the goals -the program is well under way). It would be a betrayal on a universal scale if, having pursued these priorities over a 15 year period and bent all efforts and resources to the task, to discover that the society created by this program is not one found to be desirable by those citizens who are required to live in it. Access to primary education, birthing resources, clean drinking water, the internet, etc. are notable and desirable technical accomplishments of the MDGs -but we are not collecting data on their social and political spin-offs and consequences -on the kind of society their accomplishment implies.
The final critique of the MDGs, then, is to point out that they make no mention of democracy and governance and so lose an essential grounding in localism. The goals themselves may be pursued through authoritarian, bureaucratic, democratic or any other means. In fact, they represent a set of ends divorced from means, whereas in democratic terms ends can only be justified by means -that, for example, there are threats to democracy in imposing liberal goals through autocratic, paternalistic or coercive procedures. This is, perhaps, a casualty of universalism.
I turn now to the localist view of the paradox with which this chapter started. I want to resolve the question of how we democratise MDGs -for this is still possible to an extent. I will do this by restating the argument for Democratic Evaluation -or, indeed, with its sibling, Rights-Based Evaluation.
DEMOCRATIC EVALUATION
'What goes round comes round', as they say. As international agencies intensify their advocacy of citizen rights it is not unlikely that citizens of those countries they work in will come back asking to exercise their rights.
One of the places in which we may expect rights to be asserted is over the creation of social programs which are designed to shape new futures for citizens. Women and children are asked to participate in development programs which are frequently designed and managed by others, and to In the advanced industrial countries of Europe, Australasia, the USA there is a lively debate around the merits of Democratic Evaluation -an approach that recognises that program evaluation is a form of (at best, impartial) political action. This is not to say that evaluators are party political activists, but that we recognise that knowledge and information are exchanged and applied in political contexts, and that this demands that evaluation has a political strategy. Just as we live in an age that is broadly sceptical about the possibility of value-free social science, so we are developing a scepticism about politics-free social science. Insofar as we recognise that while we are conducting evaluation we are acting politically, we look around for appropriate guides to action and to an appropriate warrant. Why? Because it does not take long into a program evaluation that evaluators often are challenged to justify their actionsfor example, in providing or withholding knowledge to one or more groups.
One of the early solutions to the dilemma was to link evaluation to The kind of democracy envisaged by evaluation theorists and tested by them in practice is the kind of civic democracy found at municipal levels of society -i.e. the pursuit of collective rights at community level. Here is an approach designed for localism and to combat universalism. Civic democracy is intimate, often face-to-face, and so involves argument and direct exchange. Since civic relations are so close, it is essential to make decisions by negotiation, and this goes for evaluators, too. What the evaluator is prepared or free to negotiate will vary according to their confidence and to their contract. Another implication of the civic model to democratic evaluation is the role of common sense. Science itself is expensive, and it is rarely available to municipal-level actors -but, in any event, local politicians and administrators live close to their constituents and have to rely on personal persuasion more than on scientific demonstration. Argument and persuasion, therefore, tend to happen on the basis of day-to-day language and concepts, and so it is in democratic evaluation. The democratic evaluator tries to collect data and report it in ways which reflect how programme people think and talk -ideally, in the language of persuasion rather than proof.
But the main implication of this civic politics understanding of Democratic Evaluation is that, as in municipal governance, political structures are defined less as sites for the determinaton and dissemination of policy and more as sites which allow for argumentation and the shaping of policythere tends to be a shift of emphasis from policy outcomes to policy processes. Those who govern are within touching distance of the governed and so have to negotiate their way. So it is with democratic approaches to evaluation which seek out that same proximity and intimacy. Hence, these are good instruments for resolving paradoxes and dilemmas created for This means that the evaluator must be, at the least reserved, about making recommendations. (This is most probably subject to less of a consensus than the others.)
Together, these define the localist project for the evaluator -the obligation to inform civil society and its professional institutions. Here are the links between democratic evaluation and good governance.
RIGHTS-BASED EVALUATION
We can invoke the concept of 'information poverty' -i.e. a parallel to material poverty with the same effect of reducing the capacity for selfdetermination. Under information poverty people have insufficient information about social arrangements that determine their lives to be able to make decisions and judgements about them. This is the case with have the right to know about it: its accomplishments, its flaws, its logic and its history. Just as with material poverty, the solution to information poverty is redistribution -i.e. from the 'information wealthy' to the 'information poor'. This has a range of procedural implications: providing access to the framing and sponsoring of enquiries; making reports publicly available; adopting methodologies which represent the real dilemmas people live with; sharing information across stakeholder groups in such a way as to allow for informed public accountability. This is about public conversation, more than management information.
The principle of rights provides the conceptual leverage for redistribution and for arriving at these procedural imperatives: some people have rights over information; others have obligations to provide it. Evaluation itself, as the generator and broker of information, is the redistributive mechanism.
The international commitment to rights-based approaches goes further than the claim people make to individual rights. Indeed, the principal (among many) critique of the rights approach is that aimed at the various UN Declarations of rights: that they individualise action rather than collectivise it (Uvin, 2004, but In the context of rights-based evaluation, and in the international language of rights, this defines the evaluator as a duty-bearer. Indeed, we might go so far as to say that the evaluator enjoys no rights at all (other than those held in trust for their respondents), but that the role is defined exclusively and uniquely in terms of obligations -obligations, that is, to allow for the redistribution of information goods. The rights-based evaluator in a democratic set-up is the servant of all rights-bearers and is warranted to grant no privileges to any. The agency that commissions an evaluation shares, by complicity, the same set of obligations and can be held, in the same way, to enjoy no privileged rights. Their role is defined as 'sponsor' not 'purchaser'. This goes for those agencies -including the United Nations -which commission evaluations of MDG progress. 
CONCLUSION: EVALUATION FOR SOCIAL CONSENSUS
All societies are characterized by fragmentation over purposes and values.
Professional practitioners, program managers and ministers, little understanding each other's challenges and accountabilities, frequently differ over how best to secure social change. The citizen, distant from exchanges between these groups, is rarely even party to them. If 'participation' meant sometimes overturning the aspirations of the political and administrative elites it would not happen -or be advocated -as often as it is. There is no need to be sentimental.
Most serious of all are breaches of communication and understanding between practitioner and government, for it is that relationship that is most potent in generating development gains and ensuring that social investment is both utilized and utilized well. Democracy may fall as a result of political corruption, but it can only stand on the basis of wellfounded, publicly accountable and responsive social institutions. The most democratically aspirational government without a consent-based, efficient police service and school system will come to nothing.
Social fragmentation is corrosive of understanding between these two groups. Program evaluation is potentially nurturing of such understanding.
Evaluation which is motivated by an ideology of rights and focused on democratic approaches to their deliberation and realization offers a site in which differences can be made transparent, legitimated, discussed and resolved. It is important to say that the resolution of differences and the forging of consensus over, for example, MDG action need not be a permanent state and need not launder fundamental differences of approach and ideal. We are talking about overlapping consensus (Rawls, 1996; Umphres, 2008) based on common moral principles, and temporary agreements focused on immediate priorities -both of which allow for continuing differences of purpose and value, but allow for immediate and In terms of our opening paradox a rights-based approach to evaluation, set within a commitment to democratic structures and processes, helps to shape that mechanism. The challenge for MDGs is to have them owned at the level of community -i.e. by those who have to live with their consequences. That ownership has to be negotiated and can neither be assumed nor imposed, for the question of whether programs of intervention which are motivated by MDGs are appropriate or desirable is entirely empirical and tested in local action. The only legitimate party to facilitate that negotiation for ownership -legitimate by virtue of being independent and impartial -is the evaluator. Whose rights is s/he championing?
